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In this paper, we present an infrastructure for providing secure transactional replication support for
peer-to-peer, decentralized databases. We first describe how to effectively provide protection against
external threats, malicious actions by servers not authorized to access data, using conventional cryp-
tography-based mechanisms. We then classify and present algorithms that provide protection against
internal threats, malicious actions by authenticated servers that misrepresent protocol-specific infor-
mation. Our approach to handling internal threats uses both cryptographic techniques and modifica-
tions to the update commit criteria. The techniques we propose are unique in that they not only enable a
tradeoff between performance and the degree of tolerance to malicious servers, but also allow for indi-
vidual servers to support non-uniform degrees of tolerance without adversely affecting the performance
of the rest of the system.
We investigate the cost of our security mechanisms in the context of Deno: a prototype object replica-
tion system designed for use in mobile and weakly-connected environments. Experimental results reveal
that protecting against internal threats comes at a cost, but the marginal cost for protecting against
larger cliques of malicious insiders is generally low. Furthermore, comparison with a decentralized
Read-One Write-All protocol shows that our approach performs significantly better under various
workloads.
1. Introduction
Asynchronous approaches (e.g., [5, 18, 22]) for managing replicated data have gained popularity due to their inher-
ent advantages over traditional synchronous solutions n mobile, large-scale, and wide-area environments. Asyn-
chronous approaches that provide the most flexibility are peer-to-peer, decentralized approaches, which can operate
under less than full connectivity, easily adapt to frequent changes in group membership, and make few demands on
the underlying network topology. These decentralized approaches, also called lazy-group [15], can support the up-
date-anytime-anywhere-anyhow model, which eliminates r strictions regarding where and how updates are pe -
formed, effectively facilitating dis- and weakly-connected operation.
Although these approaches have long been used to used to support optimistic, weakly-consistent rep-
lication [18, 21, 27, 33], it is only recently that several proposals have extended them to support serialized
single-item updates [20], and transactional updates and serializability [2, 9, 16]. With the advent of wire-
less ad-hoc networking and technologies like Bluetooth, peer-to-peer, d centralized approaches are likely
to become increasingly more prevalent in future replicated databases and systems.
 Despite all the desirable features, however, no such system could be widely deployed in mobile or
wide-area environments without ensuring that the infrastructure is secure. Decentralized and asynchro-
nous aspects of these approaches pose unique security challenges, many of which are yet to be addressed.
In this paper, we present a complete infrastructure for providing strongly-consistent, secure transactional
replication support for peer-to-peer, decentralized databases.
The infrastructure we present addresses both external and internal security threats. The prime external
threat is of an unauthenticated server attempting to read or modify data. We prevent this through a combi-
nation of cryptography-based mechanisms. Our main focus in this paper is, however, dealing with inter-
nal threats to security, which is more problematic. Internals threa s arise from duly authenticated servers
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(i.e., insiders) that attempt to
cheat by misrepresenting proto-
col-specific information. As a
trivial example, a user of a dis-
tributed meeting room scheduler
might attempt to falsify votes of
other servers in order to ensure
that he or she gets a prime reser-
vation. More serious scenarios
could arise in collaborative
intranet and Internet applica-
tions, such as scheduling and
workflow applications. Finally,
this work has obvious applica-
tions in military scenarios (e.g.,
consider communication among
tanks or mobile command posts).
We deal with malicious insiders
by using cryptographic tech-
niques, as well as modifications
to the update commit criteria.
The fundamental idea is to ensure that any protocol-specific information used is correct by using crypto-
graphic techniques when possible, or by explicitly validating any such piece of information.
This work is done in the context of Deno [9, 19], a decentralized system that supports transactional
replication for mobile and weakly-connected environments. Deno’s system model is illustrated in Figure
1. One or more clients connect to each peer server, and submit transactions. Servers communicate through
pair-wise information exchanges. Servers make all commit decisions independently and by using solely
local information. The base, non-secure Deno system has been fully implemented. We also implemented
the security extensions to the base Deno protocol needed to tolerate malicious insiders. However, we are
still building the public-key infrastructure that will be used to address external threats.
Despite the growing need for security infrastructures for managing replicated data, this topic has yet
to be well addressed in the decentralized, asynchronous environments that we target. Prior work mainly
investigated security issues in traditional synchronous environments (e.g., [25]), and environments where
strong connectivity and atomic reliable multicast primitives are available and replication can be globally
coordinated by distinguished master servers (e.g., [7, 10, 12, 30, 31]). Studies that address the restrictions
of our target environments [24], on the other hand, ignored consistency issues and made assumptions
about where and how updates are generated and initially received. Our work aims to provide flexible se-
curity mechanisms that eliminate many restrictions of prior w k while allowing for strongly-consistent
access to decentralized, replicated data. We note that, although our fault model is comprehensive, it does
not handle fully Byzantine attacks due to its reliance on digital signatures for authenticating the original
source of messages that are forwarded in the system.
In summary, this paper makes the following key contributions: Fir t, we classify internal attacks and
propose a decentralized protocol that is parametric in the degree of tolerance to malicious insiders. This
protocol allows servers to trade off the degree of this tolerance with the performance of update commits.
A unique aspect of our protocols is that individual servers can support arbit ary degrees of tolerance with-
out adversely affecting the performance of other servers. Thi  allows each server to set its security level
independently based on individual requirements or resources. The protocols we describe support strong-
consistency and global serializability. Second, we describe a combination of conventional cryptography-
based techniques that can be effectively used to provide protection against external threats in decentral-
ized, asynchronous databases. Third, we evaluate the cost of our security xtensions by implementing


































Figure 1: Basic Deno system model
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly d scribes Deno’s asynchronous, de-
centralized replication protocol. Section 3 describes a public-key based infrastructure that addresses ex-
ternal threats by providing secure authentication and encryption without compromising Deno’s ability to
make progress with low connectivity. Section 4 describes our flexible approach to handling internal
threats, which is the main contribution of this paper, Section 5 describes the Deno architecture, and Sec-
tion 6 evaluates the effect of our security measures on commit performance using a prototype system. Fi-
nally, Section 7 describes related work and Section 8 concludes.
2. Background: Deno
Deno is an object replication system that relies on a decentralized, asynchronous replica management
protocol to address concerns of performance and reliability. Under Deno, no server ever needs to have
complete knowledge of group membership, and a given server only needs to be in intermittent contact
with at least one other server to take full part in the commit ent process. As such, the protocol is highly
suited for environments with weak connectivity.
The protocol’s strengths result from a novel combination of weightd voting [14] and epidemic in-
formation flow [11], a process where information flows pair-wise through a system like a disease passing
from one host to the next. The protocol is completely decentralized. There is no primary server that owns
an item or serializes the updates to that item (as in Bayou [33]); any server can create new object replicas,
and servers need only be able to communicate with a minimum of one other server at a time in order to
make progress. Instead of synchronously assembling quorums, which has been extensively addressed by
previous work (e.g., [14, 17, 34]), votes are cast and disseminated among system servers asynchronously
through pair-wise, epidemic-style propagation. Any server can either commit or abort any transaction
unilaterally, and all servers eventually reach the same decisions.
The use of voting allows the system to have higher availability than primary-copy protocols [3]. The
use of weighted voting allows implementations to improve performance by adapting currency distribu-
tions to site availabilities, update activity, or other relevant characteristics [8]. Each server has a specific
amount of currency, and the total currency in the system is fixed at a known value. The advantage of a
static total is that servers can determine when a plurality or majority of the votes have been accumulated
without complete knowledge of group membership. This last attribute s k y in dynamic, wide-area envi-
ronments because it allows the protocol to operate in a completely d centralized fashion, eliminating per-
formance bottlenecks and single points of failure.
The use of epidemic protocols divorces protocol requirements from communication requirements.
First, an epidemic algorithm only requires protocol information to move throughout the system eventu-
ally. The lack of hard deadlines and connectivity requirements is ideally suited to mobile environments,
where individual servers are routinely disconnected. Second, epidemic protocols remove reliance on net-
work topology: synchronization partners in epidemic protocols can be chosen randomly, eliminating any
potential single point of failure.
The voting protocol ensures mutual exclusion among conflicting transactions, guaranteeing that no
two concurrent conflicting transactions can both commit. However, all transactions execute locally and no
local or global deadlocks are possible [9].
2.1 Protocol overview
At its simplest, Deno can be thought of as a set of servers that are cooperating in order to determine a se-
quential ordering of committed updates. We assume a model in which the shared state consists f a set of
objects that are replicated across multiple servers. Clients submit reads and updates to any Deno server.
Synchronization sessions between pairs of servers move newly created update records, together with other
protocol information such as votes for such, among the servers.
Updates do not commit globally in one atomic phase because we assume an epidemic style of update
propagation and poor connectivity. Asynchronous voting is used to determine wh ch updates actually
commit, and in which order. Each server commits updates independently using only local information.
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However, we show below that any update that commits at any server eventually commits everywhere, and
in the same order with respect to other committed updates. In therest of the section, we briefly discuss
our replication protocol (full details, which we omit here for brevity, can be found in [9]).
2.2 Peer-to-peer, decentralized  replication: The base Deno protocol
2.2.1 Transaction model
A transaction consists of a sequence of read and write operations. We distinguish between two types of
transactions; queries (i.e., read-only transactions) and update transactions. Both types of transactions exe-
cute entirely locally. However, queries are more light weight n that a query commits without further
processing immediately after it successfully finishes its execution. Update transactions, on the other hand,
must participate in a distributed commitment process after finishing execution. Two transactions are said
to conflict if one of the transactions updates an item accessed by the other transaction.
Database states are tracked by associating a version number with ach database item. The items in the
local copy of the database are modified, and their version numbers incremented, only when update trans-
actions commit. We assume that transactions only access committed values. Depending on application
semantics, however, this requirement can be relaxed, and transactio  may be allowed to see new values
written by uncommitted transactions. This model, also employed by Bayou [33], is especially useful in
facilitating disconnected operation.
2.2.2 Voting
In Deno, a vote (record) v, contains four pieces of information: (1) voter(v), which denotes the server that
created v; (2) trans(v), which denotes the transaction v is cast for; (3) curr(v), which denotes the currency
(i.e., weight) held by voter(v) when v is created; and (4) tstamp(v), which is the local timestamp value of
voter(v) when it created v. A server, sa, votes once (and only once) for each transaction that it observes.
We denote the vote cast by sa for transaction tj as va,j.  The primary purpose of this voting process is to
provide a total order on the set of transactions observed by a server, i.e., the set of votes that belong to
each server can be totally ordered based on vote timestamps. We say that “a transaction ti precedes trans-
action tj at sa” iff tstamp(va,i) < tstamp(va,j), and denote this relation by ti <a tj. This relation reflects the
order in which a particular server desires to commit (i.e., serialize) the transactions it observes. For in-
stance, if ti <a tj, then sa desires to commit ti before tj. This ordering information is propagated across the
system via pair-wise synchronization sessions as a part of vote records.
2.2.3 Update commitment using local information
We now describe the update commitment process from the perspective of a single server. Each Deno
server, sa, maintains a set of votes, Va, and a set of transactions, Ta. The latter set, Ta, consists of those up-
date transactions that are known to sa, have finished execution either locally or remotely, but have yet to
be either committed or aborted at sa.
The candidate transaction of a server sa, candidate(sa), is the transaction which sa desires to commit
before all others. More formally, if candidate(sa) is ti, then ti <a tj, ∀ ti, tj ∈  Ti,  i ≠ j (i.e., candidate(sa) is
the transaction that comes first in the ordering of sa). The candidate transaction set at sa, Ca, contains the
candidate transactions of all servers; i.e., Ca = {candidate(sb)}, for all servers sb.
As explained below a candidate transaction  commits at sa when sa guarantees, using locally available
information, that no other candidate transaction can obtain more votes. Transactions can be committed
even without knowledge of complete group membership because the total amount of currency in the sys-
tem is always 1.0, and the protocol guarantees that all servers eventually re ch the same commit deci-
sions. Given a server sa, its vote set Va, and its candidate transaction set Ca, we define the following:
•  Sum of votes of a candidate transaction ti: ({ })ivotes t = ,( )b icurr v∑ ,
s.t., vb,i∈ Vi, and candidate(sb) = ti.
•  Unknown votes: unknown = 1.0 – ( )avotes C∑ .
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In other words, unknown is the sum of currencies of those servers whose candidate transactions are not
yet available. We now define the commit criterion that sa uses to decide which transactions to terminate
(i.e., commit or abort) on the basis of local information. The fundamental idea is to commit a candidate
transaction when it is guaranteed that no other candidate transaction cn gather more votes.
•  Commit criterion: A candidate transaction ti commits iff:
1. |votes({ ti})| > 0.5, or (Majority case)
2. |votes({ ti})| > |votes({ tj})| + unknown,  "tj∈ Ca, and i  j. (Plurality case)
The commit criterion states that candidate transaction ti can commit if it gathers the plurality of votes.
Case 1 indicates that ti gathered majority of the votes. Case 2 ensures that no other candidate transaction,
which may or may not be known to server sa, can gather more votes (Note that ties that occur when two
candidate transactions gather the same amount of votes can be broken using a simple deterministic com-
parison between the indices of the servers that created the transactions).
When a candidate transaction t commits at server sa, sa first incorporates the effects of ti into its data-
base by installing the new values of the update items of t (available from t’s transaction record) and in-
crementing the version numbers of the local copies of those items. All candidate transactions whose read
items are modified become obsolete, and are aborted.
2.2.4 Synchronization
We now discuss how two Deno servers synchronize their states (also called anti-entropy [11] in the termi-
nology of epidemic algorithms). A pair-wise synchronization session essentially involves the propagation
of (1) transaction records, and (2) votes, that are known to one server and unknown to the other.
In Deno, synchronization is controlled via version vectors [26]. In our model, each server sa maintains
an n-element version vector, vva, where n is the number of servers, that describes the number of events of
each other server seen by sa. Element vva[b] is a scalar count of the number of sb’s events that have been
seen at sa. In our case, there are two types of events of interest: transaction pre-commits, and vote crea-
tions. A pre-commit event occurs whenever an update transaction completes its local execution on the
server where it executed and is ready to participate in the global voting process. A vote creation event
occurs whenever a server casts a vote.
In more detail, each server sa maintains a serial order, called local order, on all pre-commits and vote
creations. We denote event l of sa as lae . As information about events is always propagated in local order,
if sa’s version vector is vva, then sa has seen all events 1be …
[ ]vv ba
be , for all sb, b = 1…n. We assume a unidi-
rectional, two-message pull synchronization, although other modes are possible [11, 20]. When sa pulls
information from sb, the following actions take place:
1. Server sa sends vva to sb.
2. Server sb responds with all events lke  s.t. [ ] and [ ]a bl vv k l vv k> ≤ , for all k = 1…n.
3. Server sa incorporates the new events in the same order that they originally occurred by first ap-
plying the voting rule and the commit rule for all relevant transactions, and updating vva to the
pairwise maximum of vva and vvb
For purposes of exposition, we assumed n-dimensional vectors in the above description. Our implemen-
tation uses a set representation for the version vector; i.e., vva ={(b, cntb), (c, cntc) …}, where each pair
consists of a server id, b and a count, cntb, specifying the number of sb’s events seen by sa. Using this
synchronization protocol, the local orders at each server are propagated to the rest of the system.
2.2.5 Consistency and correctness issues
In this section, we briefly discuss the consistency and correctness related issues in the base Deno protocol.
Full details and the correctness proofs, which are omitted for brevity here, can be found in [9].
The base Deno protocol described earlier forces all update transactions to commit in the same order at
all servers, thereby providing strong consistency and serializability, where each query serializes with re-
spect to both queries and update transactions. Strong consistency is characterized by an acyclic serializa-
tion graph, prohibiting both update transaction cycles (i.e., cycles involving only update transactions) and
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multi-query cycles (i.e., cycles involving
multiple queries and one or more update
transactions) [3, 4, 13], thereby guaran-
teeing globally-serializable executions.
We also developed a weak-
consistency version of our protocol [9]
that commits an update when it is guar-
anteed that no other conflicting transaction
can gather more votes. We showed that
relaxing the level of consistency among
replicas in this manner yields performance
improvements in many cases [9]. This
weak-consistency protocol supports a
form of update consistency [3, 4, 13]
where each query serializes with respect
to all update transactions, but possibly not
with other queries. However, this protocol
does ensure that queries always observe
transactionally-consistent database states.
We do not consider the weak-consistency
protocol further in this paper, and use the
base strong-consistency protocol since; (1)
the level of consistency supported is orthogonal to the main theme of this paper; and (2) we want to es-
tablish a fair comparison with another decentralized protocol that provides strong-consistency (see Sec-
tion 6).
2.3 Protocol illustration
We illustrate our protocol in Figure 2 with an example scenario. The system has four servers, all with cur-
rency of 0.25. Server sa creates a new update, t1, votes for it, and sends a message describing t1 and its
vote to sb via a synchronization session. Server sb votes for t1, and then later transfers notice of t1 and both
votes to sc. After adding its own vote, sc can commit t1 because it has gathered a plurality. Later synchro-
nization sessions move the votes back to sb and sa, which also reach the same commit decision.
Meanwhile, sd has created a conflicting update t4. Eventually, sd learns of t1 (and the corresponding
votes for t1 from sa, sb, sc), commits t1 (since |votes({ t1}| = 0.75), and aborts t4 (since t4 becomes obsolete
by the commitment of t1).
3. External security threats
In this section, we describe how a decentralized, peer-to-peer syst m, such as Deno, can effectively pro-
vide protection against external security threats using conventional public-key techniques. We define an
external security threat as one that is posed by a principal (server) that has not been authenticated into the
system. We first discuss authentication, and then integrity and privacy.
3.1 Authentication
A principal (server) is authenticated into the system by identifying itself to a distinguished server acting
as the certificate authority (CA). We assume a priori that all servers trust the CA, and know the CA’s
public key. The CA responds with an ccess certificate that specifies the principal’s rights in the system.
Certificates may provide either read or read/write permission for a given database, and may contain a
timestamp that delimits the certificate’s lifetime. Since a certificate is signed by the CA, any server with
sa sb sc sd
v(a) = t1






















Figure 2: Illustrating update commitment
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the CA’s public key can verify that the certificate is valid, and certificates can not be forged. Note that we
assume a priori that all servers trust the CA, and know the CA’s public key.
Access certificates are checked in three situations; (1) aserver requesting an initial copy of the DB
must present a read certificate; (2) a server performing its periodic pull of information from another server
must at least provide a read certificate, and (3) servers will not vote for a new transaction unless it is ac-
companied by a valid read/write certificate from the transaction’s creato .
A CA represents a single point of failure in a system thatis otherwise completely decentralized.
However, this bottleneck only affects one-time authentication into the system. The CA is afterwards not
needed to arbitrate even between servers that come into contact for the first time. For example, consider
three salesmen who meet for the first time on a train and wish to collaborate on a pre-existing document,
setting up a local ad hoc network in order to communicate among themselves. The salesmen do not have
to have contact with a CA in order to start collaborating. On the other hand, if only one of the salesmen
initially has a copy of the data, the others cannot make copies unl s they already have certificates, or are
currently connected to the CA.
We solve this problem by allowing the CA to issue ticket-granting tickets (TGT), analogously to Ker-
beros [32]. A TGT gives the bearer a limited ability to make nd grant new certificates for resources and
properties. In our architecture, use of a TGT requires direct confirmation from the user. Note the TGT’s
can be used to generalize the system to include a hierarchy of CA’s. This not only provides load-
balancing for access to the CA’s, but increases the chances that a CA is available when needed.
We allow certificates to be revoked via the issue of a certificate revocation list (CRL) from the pri-
mary CA. This presents problems because Deno servers have no notion of simultaneity, unlike secure
multicast groups and other analogous systems. In other words, given that a CRL has been issued, when
are revoked certificates guaranteed to be denied? We solve this problem by casting the issue of a CRL as
just another update transaction. The CRL update competes with other transactions to commit. Once the
CRL update has been committed, we can guarantee that no subsequent update will be committed with the
aid of a vote authenticated by a revoked certificate. A secondary avant ge of casting the CRL issue as an
update is that it guarantees quick dissemination. Otherwise, knowledge of the CRL might disseminate
quite slowly because the CA is not consulted during the normal course of events.
3.2 Integrity and privacy
Figure 3 shows Deno’s approach to providing both integrity and privacy guarantees for communicated
data. Note that this method is very similar to the method used in PGP. Integrity is provided by appending
a message authentication code (MAC) to each message, which in this case is the MD5 hash of the mes-
sage signed by encrypting with the source’s private key. Privacy is provided by encrypting the message
and the MAC with a randomly generated, one-time session key. The session key is then encrypted with
the destination’s public key, and the concatenation of the encrypted session key, MAC, and message is













Figure 3: Integrity with privacy: We use symmetric encryption (i.e., Triple-DES) to encrypt the message, and asym-
metric encryption (i.e., RSA) to encrypt the symmetric key and sign the message. K-PRIsrc and K-PUBdest are private
and public keys of the source and destination of the message, respectively (double bars indicate concate ation).
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The use of peer-to-peer one-time session keys allows us to avoid the key changing problem incurred
by secure multicast trees [31] (note that these peer-to-peer keys ne d not be one time; instead they may be
cached and re-used later). Secure multicast trees generally use a single session key for the entire group.
Any change in group membership requires the session key to be changed. The key must be changed when
a new server, sn, is added to the group because we do not want sn to be able to read messages that were
sent prior to its joining (we assume that sn might have recorded prior encrypted messages even though it
could not read them). Similarly, the key should be changed when sn l aves the group because we do not
want sn to be able to read messages that are sent after it leaves the group. The use of peer-to-peer session
keys, thus, eliminates a similar need in our model.
4. Internal security threats
This section presents the central contribution of this paper: th  way that we deal with internal threats. An
internal threat is one that results from an authenticated but malicious server. Such malicious insiders mis-
represent protocol-specific information, and can cause potentially corrupt objects to propagate throughout
the network. Under certain circumstances, even a single malicious insider with arbitrarily small amount of
currency can cause different transactions to be committed at different servers. We begin with a discussion
of the set of malicious actions a server can undertake, and then discuss our approaches for handling them.
4.1 Malicious actions
Before we classify the actions a malicious intruder can take, we should note that malicious servers can
always commit arbitrary transactions to their local databases without even advertising the transaction to
other servers. Malicious ervers can also remain within the protocol framework and issue updates that, if
committed, obscure or undo the effects of other updates. This type of behavior can only be handled in an
application-specific manner and is beyond the scope of this work. Under certain circumstances, even a
single malicious server can accomplish a denial-of-service attack by refusing to vote its currency. This
attack is handled by the Deno’s normal currency revocation mechanism [8] used to recover from be-
nignly-failed servers.
The goal of this section is to describe the types of damage that malicious servers can inflict on other
servers. Malicious insiders can only corrupt the view of other servers by propagating valid but incorrect
protocol information. This potentially causes different servers to commit updates inconsistently across the
system, which in turn violates any global correctness guarantees and leads to a divergence among the da-
tabases at different servers. In our framework, a malicious server can incorrectly report currency values or
votes.
4.1.1 Currency misrepresentation
The problem here is of a server misrepresenting the amount of curren y it has available for voting
purposes. This is possible since Deno servers can perform peer-to-peer currency exchanges to migrate
currency allocations towards a target distribution. A peer-to-peer exchange is used by two servers to re-
allocate their currency between them. Although this local operation enables light-weight replica creation,
retirement, and dynamic currency redistribution [8], and it poses a unique security problem in that it
cannot be directly verified by other servers.
We make this operation secure by requiring each currency exchange to be formalized as an update. A
currency transfer from si to sj is only considered complete when the corresponding exchange update is
committed. Note that such exchange updates are commutative with respect to all other updates and are
generally committed faster than ordinary updates.
4.1.2 Vote misrepresentation
There are two types of vote misrepresentation:
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1. Misrepresenting non-local votes: A malicious server sm misrepresents or forges some other server sa’s
vote to a third server sb.  This can happen, for instance, when sa and sb are connected through sm, sa
reports its vote to sm and sm forges this vote and reports a different vote for sa to sb. This type of mali-
cious behavior is prevented by requiring each server to sign its vote  using a suitable digital signature
technique. The worst a malicious server can do then is to never report sa’s vote to sb. Since our sym-
metric, peer model does not impose any specific connectivity requirements, this behavior can only
delay committing of transactions, but cannot affect correctness.
2. Misrepresenting local votes: The second vote misrepresentation is more difficult to guard against and
can quite easily be used to violate all correctness guarantees. In this case, a server (possibly signs) and
illegally votes its own currency more than once for multiple transactions. Consider the example
shown in Figure 4. Assume that server sm is malicious. If sm tells sa that it votes for x, and sb that it
votes for y, then both destinations reach the conclusion that their candidates have more than 50% of
the vote and can be committed. Furthermore, securely signed votes do not help in this case since sm
can properly sign its own vote for any transaction. In the rest of this section, we investigate ap-
proaches to detecting such malicious servers, and develop an algorithm that guarantees correctness at
all non-malicious servers.
4.2 Approaches for handling internal threats
We now present a new, decentralized algorithm that (a) guarantees correctness even when there are (mul-
tiple) malicious servers, and (b) allows progress even when not all votes have been reported. The idea is
to make commit decisions based on votes that are guaranteed to belong to n -malicious servers.
4.2.1 Secure update commitment
We first distinguish between validated and unvalidated votes: formers are votes that are known to be cor-
rect (i.e., non-malicious), and latter are votes that may or may not be correct (we describe how votes are
validated below). Our approach hinges on the following key observation:
Up to δ malicious servers can be kept from corrupting the decentralized commitment process if
the δ largest unvalidated votes are not used in any commit decision,
where δ  is called the degree of tolerance to malicious servers (δ = 0...n-1). Consider the following exam-
ple: if there is a single malicious server, then any single vot  may be a duplicate. The server can commit
the transaction if the transaction can obtain plurality w hout counting the largest unvalidated vote for that
transaction. This observation follows since, by definition, (i) validated votes cannot be duplicates and (ii)
of the unvalidated votes, at worst the largest unvalidated vote
may be a duplicate. Therefore, this worst case duplicate vote
cannot be counted towards the commit decision at this server.
 In general, votes({ ti})  consists of validated votes,
valid({ ti}) , and unvalidated votes, unvalid({ ti}). Note that we
consider votes cast by the local server to be validated votes.
We denote the currency of any vote v in votes({ ti}) by |v|.
Similarly, we denote the total currency for a set V of votes by
|V|, e.g., |votes({ ti}) | denotes the sum of the currencies of all
votes cast for ti³T. Finally, let unvalid(δ, T) be the set of δ
elements with the largest currency in u valid(T). If we con-
sider all votes in the base Deno system to be validated, then
the base commit criterion for ti can be stated as in the top row
of Table 1, where unknown is defined as 1 - |votes({ C}) | and C
is the set of candidate transactions.
In order to provide resilience against malicious servers, the
non-secure commit criterion is modified as in the second row




|sb| = .5 -ε/2
v(sa) = x




Figure 4: Vote misrepresentation: By
telling sa and sb different votes, sm can cause
them to commit conflicting updates (|| is the
currency held by s and v(s) is the transaction
s votes for).
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lower bound on the amount of currency that ti is guaranteed to have by not using the δ largest unvalidated
votes cast for ti. The right hand side of the inequality, as before, provides an upper bound on the amount
of currency tj can possibly get. Thus, the amount of currency required to commit ti must be larger than the
total currency for any other transaction tj even if the largest δ unvalidated votes for ti are in fact cast by
malicious servers, and are thus not valid. If the server knows of no other transactions tj, but it has not yet
seen votes from all other servers, then it simply assumes all unknown votes are cast for some other trans-
action (analogous to the quantity unknown in the base commit criterion). Note that this criterion is
equivalent to the base, non-secure commit criterion if we set δ equal to zero (in which case all unvalidated
vote sets are null).
In order to validate a vote for transaction ti from a server sb, a server sa must ensure that all other serv-
ers in the system have seen the same vote. Thus, server a must collect receipts of the votes cast by sb to
all other servers. A receipt of server sb’s vote from server sc is a statement of the form “Server sb votes for
transaction ti”, securely signed by server sc using an appropriate digital signature. Server sa considers a
particular vote valid if and only if it has received receipts for that vote from all other servers in the system
or if the vote is cast by server sa itself. In order to validate a vote, a server sa does not need to establish a
peer-to-peer connection with all other servers in the system — instead, receipts for votes from any server
can be forwarded by any other server in the system. Since strong cryptographic primitives protect the re-
ceipts, even malicious servers will not be able to alter th  contents of the receipt. Malicious servers may
corrupt or discard receipts: corrupt receipts will be detected by the server validating the receipt, while dis-
carded receipts will be treated as any lost message. In the worst case, malicious servers may be able to
affect the liveness properties of the algorithm, but once again, we have been able to restore the safety
guarantees1.
When a server detects a malicious vote while performing validation, it marks the corresponding
server as malicious, ignores all further votes from that server, and initiates the currency revocation
mechanism [8] to cancel the voting rights of the malicious server. If the server already committed an up-
date incorrectly using a malicious vote — which can happen only if the degree of tolerance set by the
server is less than the actual number of malicious insiders — the server has to rollback the effects of the
update.
4.2.2 Correctness of the secure commit criterion
We now provide a proof sketch for the correctness of the secure commit criterion. The correctness proof
for the non-secure commit criterion (i.e., δ =0) can be found in [9].
Consider n servers s1, s2, ..., sn, with currencies c1, c2, ..., cn. Consider a single server si and the case
where there is a single malicious server sm, i, m = 1...n and i  m. Assume that server si commits transac-
tion ti using the secure commit criterion shown in Table 1. There are two cases: (1) si does not use cm to-
wards the votes cast for ti, and (2) si uses cm towards the votes cast for ti. In the former case, ti gathered the
plurality of votes by using only the non-malicious votes, so the decision s correct. In this case, the com-
mit criterion is more conservative than required. In case (2), |votes({ ti})| - ci provides a lower bound on
the valid votes cast for ti. This statement follows since |votes({ ti})| - |unvalid(1, {ti})|  |votes({ ti})| - ci as
ci  |unvalid(1, {ti})|. The commit criterion in this case is conservative if ci  |unvalid(1, {ti})|. Therefore
in each case si uses only the currencies that are cast by non-malicious server  towards committing ti. A
straightforward induction on the number of malicious servers concludes the proof.
                                                          
1 We stated that we wanted to provide absolute, non-pr babilistic, guarantees. Our scheme relies on the integrity of the digital
signature used; i.e., our guarantees are only as strong as the underlying digital signature scheme.
1. |votes({ti})| > 0.5, or
2. |votes({ti})| > |votes({tj}) | + unknown,   ti, tj∈ C, ij
non-secure
criterion
1. |votes({ti})| - |unvalid(δ, {t i})| >  + 0.5, or
2. |votes({ti})| - |unvalid(δ, {t i})| > |votes({tj})| + unknown,   ti, tj∈ C, ij
secure
criterion
Table 1: Commit criteria
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4.2.3 Examples and discussion
In this section, we illustrate, via a set of examples, some of the more subtle properties of the secure plu-
rality algorithm. We begin with a simple example of applying the secure protocol to the three server case
shown in Figure 4. We had shown earlier that if server sm is malicious, in the base protocol, under appro-
priate circumstances, it could cause the committed views of server  sa and sb to diverge arbitrarily far even
if it held arbitrarily small amount of currency in the system.  Now we show that even if server sm is mali-
cious and holds arbitrarily large amounts of currency in the system, it cannot cause a ingle incorrect
commit at either servers sa or sb, as long as servers sa and sb operate under the assumption that there are
malicious servers in the system. Assume sm holds an arbitrary amount (say cm) of currency.  Once again,
assume the rest of the currency is distributed equally between servers a and sb (the analysis for the other
cases are analogous and is omitted for brevity).
Consider the scenario when both servers sa and sb are trying to commit different transactions t1 and t2,
respectively. Assume server sm tells server sa that it votes for transaction t1: this would be enough under
the base commit criterion for server sa to commit. But under the new commit criterion, server sa considers
its local votes as validated, but the quantity |unvalid(1,{t1})| is non-zero since there is only one other vote
and it is unvalidated. The commit criterion is not satisfied and server sa must delay committing its trans-
action till it receives a receipt for server sm’s vote from server sc. Transactions can, therefore, be commit-
ted if and only if server sm votes consistently and correctly.
In the following examples, assume the secure commit criterion is used with the assumption that there
is at most one malicious server in the system (i.e., δ =1). The first example shows that even under conten-
tion (i.e. when there is more than a single transaction competing for commitment), the commit criterion
does not necessarily require any votes to be validated to commit a transaction.
Example 1: Assume five servers, 1, s2, …, s5, in the system, each holding equal (i.e., 0.2) currency, and
the following votes at s1: V1={( s1, t1), (s2, t1), (s3, t1), (s4, t1), (s5, t2)}. In terms of the new commit crite-
rion: |votes({ t1})|=0.8, |unvalid(1, {t1})|=0.2, |votes({ t2})|=0.2, and unknown=0.0. In this case, s1 can
commit t1 without validating a single vote!
The second example shows that even when validation of at least one vote is necessary, it is not neces-
sarily the case that all votes have to be validated.
Example 2: Assume servers s1, s2, ..., s4 have currencies 0.2, 0.4, 0.2, and 0.5, respectively. Votes at s1 are:
V1={( s1, t1),(s2, t1),(s3, t1), (s4, t2)}. In terms of the new commit criterion: |votes({ t1})|=0.8,
|unvalid(1,{t1})|=0.4, |votes({ t2})|=0.5, and unknown=0.0. Server s1 can not commit t1 because:
|votes({ t1}| - |unvalid(1, {t1})|= 0.4, whereas |votes(t2)| +  unknown is 0.5. Validating s3’s vote would
have no immediate utility. However, if s2’s vote were validated instead, the commit could take place. As
can be seen from the secure commit criterion in Table 1, validating  vote can only have an immediate
effect on a commit decision if it affects unvalid(1, {t1}). Validating s2’s vote has such an effect; vali-
dating s3’s does not.
5. Deno architecture
This section briefly describes the basic architecture of Deno object replication system. The overriding
goal of the Deno project is to investigate replica consistency protocols for dis- and weakly-connected en-
vironments. The basic Deno API [19] supports operations for creating objects, creating and deleting ob-
ject replicas, and performing reads and writes on the shared objects in a transactional framework.
Figure 5 illustrates the basic Deno server architecture. The Serv r Manager is in charge of coordi-
nating the activities of the various components. It also handles client requests by implementing the basic
Deno API. The Consistency Controller implements the decentralized voting protocols used by Deno. In
particular, it maintains a vote pool that summarizes the votes known to the server. The Synch Controller
is responsible for implementing efficient synchronization session  with other Deno servers by maintain-
ing version vectors that compactly summarize the events of interest from other servers. This component
implements synchronization policies that specify when and with which server to synchronize. The Trans
Manager is responsible for the local execution of transactions. It maintains a transaction pool that con-
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tains all active transactions known to the
server. The Storage Manager provides
access to the object store that stores the
current committed versions of all repli-
cated objects at the server. The object
store is currently implemented as an in-
memory database.
The prototype makes relatively few
demands on the operating system and is
therefore highly portable. The current
prototype runs on top of Linux and
WindowsNT/CE platforms. All commu-
nication is layered atop UDP/IP. Deno
consists of ~13,000 lines of multi-
threaded C++ code, and has a footprint
of ~170KB.
6. Performance evaluation
6.1 Experimental environment and performance metrics
Using our prototype system, we now evaluate the cost of the proposed security mechanisms for Deno’s
decentralized voting protocol and a ROWA-type decentralized protocol (described below). We performed
the experiments on a 16 node Linux cluster with each node running a copy of the Deno server. Each node
contains two 400 MHz Pentium II processors and 256 MBytes of RAM. We note that none of the results
presented below consume all of a machine’s resources. We intentionally set our communication rates low
in order to reflect the constraints of our expected environment. Instead, our performance evaluation con-
centrates on relative performance by comparing the convergence rates of th  investigated protocols.
The machines were connected via a dedicated 100Mbps Ethernet network and the Deno servers
communicated using UDP. In order to concentrate on the convergence speed of the protocols, we used a
small database consisting of 100 data objects of size 20K each. E Deno server periodically initiates a
synchronization session by sending a pull request to another randomly selected server. Each server gener-
ated transactions according to a global transaction rate (specified relative to a synchronization period).
Each transaction accessed and modified up to five data items. In all experiments, currency is uniformly
distributed across servers, and all objects are replicated at all servers. The main parameters and settings
used in the experiments are summarized in Table 2.
The results presented in the following plots are the average of at least five independent runs of exe-
cuting 1000 transactions in the system. The contributions of the first 50 transactions are excluded to ac-
count to eliminate system warm-up effects. The bandwidth requirements for transactional and consistency
data were negligible compared to that required for propagating updated v lues, so we do not consider this
question further.
For context, we also show the performance of a second decentralized scheme, write-all, which is
an epidemic  “Read-One, Write-All” (ROWA) [3] protocol modeling the other peer-to-peer decentralized
transactional protocol in the literature. This protocol commits transactions after ensuring that all other
servers are ready to commit. Therefore, a transaction has to be pr pagated to all the servers before it can








Storage Manager Synch ControllerTrans Manager Consistency Controller
Commit log Version vectors
Figure 5: Deno prototype
Parameter Description Setting
Synch Period (SP) Mean synchronization period                                       (uniform) 0 – 5    (secs)
Transaction Rate (TR) Mean transaction generation rate                                       (uniform) 0 – 5    (trans/synch period)
Num Servers (n) Number of Deno servers 3 – 30
Trans Size Number of items updated by a transaction                        (uniform) 0 – 5
Degree of tolerance (δ) Number of malicious servers that can be tolerated 0 – n-1
Table 2: Primary experimental parameters and settings
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action gathers all the votes in the system. A similar ROWA-type epidemic protocol was proposed by
Agrawal et al. [2]. We also implemented a secure version of write-all, which also uses a straightfor-
ward adaptation of the vote validation technique described in Section 4.2.
The primary performance metric we consider is average commit delay, which denotes the time be-
tween the initiation of a transaction and average of the times at which it is committed by individual serv-
ers in the system.  As a measure of scalability, we report the change in commit delay as the number of
servers in the system change. We also use commit percentage, the percentage of transaction initiated
transactions that are committed, when we explore the effects of update contention. In each case, we con-
sider the efficacy of our algorithms by varying the degree of tolerance to malicious servers and where ap-
plicable, compare our results to write-all.
 Before presenting our results, we would like to note that individually signing a large number of votes
and receipts using a conventional digital signature scheme such a  RSA can be computationally expen-
sive: the execution times for signing a 16 byte hash code using 512 bit keys using the RSAref library from
RSA Security Inc. (see www.rsa.com) is approximately 330 msecs in our environment. Instead, any set of
votes and receipts can be signed together as a single message. Furthermore, probabilistic techniques that
trade off signature quality to computational overhead can also be used to decrease this computational cost
by several orders of magnitude (e.g., [6]).
6.2 Commit delays vs. degree of tolerance to malicious servers
Figure 6 shows the average commit delays for very small transaction generation rates (i.e., no update
contention), for Deno and write-all, with varying degrees of tolerance to malicious servers, i.e., δ.
On the x-axis we vary δ from 0 (non-secure system) to n-1 (max-security system). The curve for Deno
follows an S-shape; initially increasing gradually with increasing δ, making a significant jump in the vi-
cinity of δ = n/2, and then essentially staying flat afterwards. As long as δ is smaller than n/2, servers do
not need to use validated votes to commit an update; it simply is enough to gather sufficient unvalidated
votes. For instance, assuming no update contention and set to 15, a single update can be committed with
11, 12, 13, 14 unvalidated votes when δ is 3, 4, and 5, respectively. However, when δ is more than half
the servers, it is not possible to commit updates without the use of validated votes. Vote validation is a
relatively costly operation, as it involves obtaining receipts from the other servers in the system. This ex-
plains the sudden increase in commit delays as δ exceeds n/2. After this point, commit delays continue to
increase as more validated votes are required for commit. At the point where half of the all votes are vali-
dated, updates can immediately commit, which is the reason why commit delays for Deno essentially
stays constant for relatively large δ values.
The figure also depicts commit delays for non-secure write-all (δ = 0), and secure write-all (δ >
0). Since secure write-all requires all votes to be validated for commit, it cannot support intermediate
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Figure 7: Percentage of validations required/available for
commit vs. degree of tolerance, n=15, TR=0.01, SP=2.0
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cantly faster than write-all, reducing the commit delays of write-all by 40% and 30% for non-
secure (δ = 0) and maximum security cases (δ = n-1), respectively. The most dramatic improvement,
60%, occurs when 0 < δ < n/2, since, in this region, Deno commits updates without validating any votes,
whereas write-all has to validate all votes before committing an update.
Figure 7 provides more insight by plotting the percentage of validated votes used and those that are
available at commit time at each server, averaged over all commits across all servers. As we expected, no
validated votes are used at commit by Deno when δ < n/2. In this region, validated votes available at
commit time at each server are non-zero, because each server considers its own vote as validated by de-
fault. Notice that Deno requires at most 50% of the votes to be validated for supporting any degree of tol-
erance. On the other hand, write-all requires 100% votes to be validated to tolerate any number of
malicious servers, thereby incurring relatively large commit delays.
6.3 Performance implications of supporting non-uniform degrees of tolerance
We now investigate the performance impact of using different degrees of tolerance at different servers.
We expect that the commit performance of each server be indepe nt from the degrees of tolerance sup-
ported by others, since each Deno server makes all commit decisions entirely independently and using
only local information. To demonstrate the validity of this premise, w conducted an experiment where
we let a single server, s use a degree of tolerance, δ (s), different from that used by the rest of the servers,
δ (rest).
Figure 9 presents commit delay results for s and the rest of servers (averaged) for the cases where δ
(s) = 0 and δ (s) = n-1, as we vary δ (rest) -- note that d refers to δ in the figures. When we consider the
commit delay curve for s when k(s)=0, we observe that the curve remains essentially flat reg rdless of the
degree of tolerance used by the other servers. Even when δ (r st) is set to n-1, the performance of s is not
affected at all. The same observation holds for the case where δ (s) = n-1. It is evident that the commit
performance of a server is not affected by the performance of the rest of the system. The commit delay
curves for the rest of the system for δ (s) = 0 and δ (s) = n-1 illustrate the complementary case. We ob-
serve that the two curves are essentially identical, revealing that the performance of the system as a whole
is not affected by the degree of tolerance set by k. It is therefore clear that the degree of tolerance used by
a server does not adversely affect the performance of other servers and vice versa.
6.4 Scalability
Figure 8 shows commit delays for Deno with various degrees of tolerance for malicious servers, and for
secure and non-secure versions of write-all, as the number of servers is varied from 3 to 30. As ex-
pected, the commit delays increase as the system size increases for both Deno and write-all. Non-



















wa (non-secure) wa (secure) Deno (d=0)
Deno (d=n/2-1) Deno (d=n-1)







0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14











s (d(s)=0) rest (d(s)=0)
s (d(s)=n-1) rest (d(s)=n-1)
Figure 9: Supporting non-uniform degrees of tolerance at
individual servers, n=15, TR=1.0, SP=2.0
15
this tolerance degree, commits do not require any
validated votes, eliminating the need to contact
every other server in the system. This also explains
why Deno with δ = n/2-1 performs better than even
the non-secure write-all, which needs to con-
tact all servers to commit an update. We also ob-
serve that Deno with max-security (i.e., δ = n-1)
commits updates faster than secure write-
all(since Deno needs to validate at most half the
votes), and the difference between the two ap-
proaches increases with increasing system size.
6.5 Update contention effects
We now investigate the effects of update contention on Deno and write-all. Figure 10 plots commit
percentage results for varying transaction generation rates. Th  figure shows that all approaches suffer
from the increased transaction rate due to the global update consistency requirement that at most one out
of a set of conflicting transactions can commit (the transactions that are aborted can be restarted depend-
ing on application semantics). Under very small transaction rates, TR∈ [0.0-0.01], all protocols perform
fairly well, committing all updates. With increasing transaction rates, however, commit percentages drop
for all protocols significantly. We observe the most dramatic f ll for secure write-all: at a transaction
rate of 0.4, the commit percentage of secure write-all is ~25%, whereas the commit percentages of
the other protocols are all above 65%. Notice that beyond a transaction rate f 0.5, max-security Deno has
a higher commit percentage than even the non-secure write-all. The reason for this interesting result
lies in the fundamental difference in the way Deno and write-all treat conflicting updates. Deno’s
voting algorithm can globally pick a single update out of a set of conflicting updates to commit. The
write-all protocol clearly lacks such a mechanism and thus has to abort all conflicting updates. Due
to this behavior, beyond some update contention, the write-all approaches, both secure and non-
secure, are not able to commit any updates (beyond 6 and 10 transactions/synch period, respectively). On
the other hand, Deno approaches continue to make progress and commit updates reg rdless of the update
generation rate (not shown).
7. Related work
The work related to this paper falls into two distinct categories: weakly-connected (transactional) systems
and security for groups and elections. Most existing asynchronous update-anywhere protocols use the
epidemic model (e.g., [2, 11, 18, 27, 28, 33]). Many epidemic systems take an optimistic approach and
use reconciliation-based protocols (e.g., Ficus [27], Lotus Notes [18]) that are only viable in non-
transactional domains. Agrawal et al. [2] proposed a decentralized Read-One, Write-All [3] approach that
was the first decentralized, epidemic protocol to ensure strong c nsistency and serializability. More re-
cently, several work [9, 16, 20] investigated the integration of decentralized voting protocols with the epi-
demic communication mainly to achieve increased availability and performance with respect to primary-
copy and ROWA-type epidemic approaches. However, none of these proposals addressed the security
issues we study in this paper.
Liu et al. [23] addressed the issue of backing out malicious but committed transactions.  This work is
complementary to our study in this paper, and can be used by a server that incorrectly committed an up-
date by not supporting a sufficient degree of tolerance. Agrawal nd El Abbadi [1] used quorums to pre-
serve confidentiality of replicated data despite the disclosure of the contents of a threshold of the reposito-
ries. Ray et al. [29] presented a locking-based, advanced secure commit protocol for multi-level secure
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The work most closely related to ours is that by Malkhi et al. [24], which provides an analytical
treatment of epidemic-style update diffusion (i.e., propagation) algorithms that are tolerant of Byzantine
faults. This work assumes that less than t replicas fail and each update is initially received by at le st t
non-malicious replicas. Each non-malicious replica commits an update only it receives the update from t
others. Although our protocols do not handle fully Byzantine failures (since we use digital signatures for
authenticating forwarded protocol information), we do not make any assumptions about how and where
updates are generated and initially received. We also integrate our security extensions on top of decen-
tralized consistency protocols (i.e., voting and ROWA) and provide strong-consistency, whereas [24]
does not address consistency issues and assumes a non-transactional setting.
The security protocols described here are also related to tradition l security in group communication
systems and protocols. Ensemble [31] addresses only external security threats, whereas Rampant [30] is
designed to handle Byzantine attacks. Castro and Liskov [7] describ d a practical replication algorithm
for tolerating Byzantine attacks in asynchronous environments. These protocols are commonly based on
primary-copy models to coordinate replica management and require mch stronger connectivity and reli-
able multicast primitives than is required by Deno.
Finally, our work is different from existing secure election protocols (e.g., [10, 12]) in two major
ways.  By design, many existing secure voting protocols provide voter privacy and rely on a small num-
ber of central facilities for counting votes. In Deno, voter privacy is not an issue and the weakly con-
nected nature of the underlying network makes reliance on central authorities untenable.
8. Conclusions
Decentralized, asynchronous approaches to replicated data managemet, whil  being well-suited for fa-
cilitating dis- and weakly-connected operation, also raise unique security challenges not present in their
centralized, synchronous counterparts. We presented a complete infrastructure for protecting such highly-
available, decentralized databases against malicious attacks, while providing strongly-consistent access to
replicated data. We first addressed external attacks and described how to effectively provide authentica-
tion, integrity, and privacy using a proper combination of well-known cryptographic techniques. We then
classified and addressed potential internal attacks, which cannot solely be handled using cryptographic
techniques; requiring modifications to the update commit criterion and explicit validation of protocol in-
formation. We proposed a flexible, parameterized protocol that allows servers to set arbitrary degrees of
tolerance to malicious insiders.
We evaluated the cost of our security protocols using the Deno prototype replicated system. The ex-
perimental results revealed that: (1) protecting against internal threats comes at a cost, but the marginal
cost for protecting against larger cliques of malicious insider  is generally low; (2) our decentralized pro-
tocol performs, scales, and handles update contention significantly bet er than a ROWA-based decentral-
ized protocol; (3) our approach allows servers to trade off performance and the degree of tolerance to ma-
licious insiders, and; (4) individual servers can support different degrees of tolerance without adversely
impacting the performance of other servers, allowing servers to set arbitrary degrees of tolerance based on
their individual requirements and resources.
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